Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?

As an expert in philosophical discourse, I find the question you've posed to be a classic one that delves into the nature of piety and the relationship between human virtues and divine approval. This question is reminiscent of the Euthyphro dilemma, a philosophical problem concerning the nature of morality and the will of the gods, as discussed by Socrates in Plato's dialogue "Euthyphro."

The dilemma is essentially about whether an action is considered pious (or morally right) because the gods love it, or whether the gods love it because it is pious. This question challenges the basis of morality and the role of divine beings in defining what is right and wrong.

To approach this question, we must first consider the nature of piety.
Piety traditionally refers to a strong and respectful devotion or commitment to religious practices and moral duties. It is often associated with virtues such as reverence, humility, and obedience to a higher power or divine will.

Now, let's examine the two propositions:

1. **The gods love the pious because it is pious**: This suggests that there is an inherent quality to piety that is recognized and valued by the gods. It implies that the gods have a standard of morality that is independent of their own will. In this view, piety is not arbitrary but is grounded in a set of principles or values that are universally recognized as good, even by divine beings.

2. **The pious is pious only because it is loved by the gods**: This proposition takes a different stance, suggesting that the very definition of piety is dependent on the approval of the gods. Here, the gods' love is the sole determinant of what constitutes piety. This view can lead to a form of moral relativism, where what is considered pious can change based on the whims or preferences of the gods.

Socrates, in his dialogue with Euthyphro, challenges the second proposition by suggesting that if the nature of piety were to change based on the gods' love, then the same action could be both pious and impious at different times, which is logically inconsistent. This leads to a deeper question about the stability and universality of moral principles.

The Euthyphro dilemma is a significant one because it raises questions about the source of moral values. If morality is derived solely from divine command, then it could be subject to change and be different across various religious contexts. However, if morality is inherent and independent of divine approval, then it suggests a more objective and universal moral framework.

In modern philosophical discourse, this dilemma is often discussed in the context of divine command theory versus moral realism. Divine command theory posits that an action is morally right because a god commands it, while moral realism holds that there are objective moral truths that exist independently of any divine decree.

The question you've asked is not just about piety but about the very foundations of ethics and morality. It invites us to reflect on whether our moral judgments are based on a transcendent, objective standard or are they contingent upon the arbitrary will of the divine.

In conclusion, the question of whether the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, or whether it is pious because it is loved by the gods, is a profound one that touches upon the heart of philosophical and theological inquiry. It challenges us to consider the nature of morality, the role of the divine, and the source of our ethical principles.

Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only that which is loved by all of the gods unanimously (9e). ... Socrates asks whether the gods love the pious because it is the pious, or whether the pious is pious only because it is loved by the gods (10a).